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013.06.00Abstract E-government implementations in developing countries still face difﬁculties, leading to a
large failure ratio. This is too high a cost for developing countries. Analysis of the reasons behind
success and failure of e-government projects is still an interesting domain of investigation. Several
approaches were advanced and success and failure factors have been stipulated, but factors perti-
nent to Public Administration have yet to be investigated and analyzed. This work builds on the
results of earlier research, analyzing the factors behind the change in performance of the different
sites of a speciﬁc project, reasons of their original success, and the relapse of one site. It reviews in
detail the factors advanced by previous works and integrates for the ﬁrst time the results obtained
by 3 different research methodologies. It clariﬁes the causality between different factors presumed
to individually affect the e-government implementations, thus enabling the disambiguation between
the main and secondary less effective causes of failure. The success and failure factors signiﬁcance
and relative importance are identiﬁed, revealing the recommended track of action for the set-back
remedy.
 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Faculty of Computers and Information,
Cairo University.1. Introduction
E-government is perceived as a tool to increase citizens’ trust
and conﬁdence in their governments [1–4]. It can simply be
considered an additional service channel, among many, that
citizens can use to interact with public administration andFaculty of Computers and
r
ng by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of F
2government entities [5,6]. Citizens can choose using ‘‘modern’’
channels or remain on traditional ones depending on the level
of barriers to access technology (notably internet and comput-
ers): the mental access, material access, skills access, and usage
access [7].
Internet advocates always praise the merits of web based
e-government including the ease, convenience, and effective-
ness of using the internet. However, citizens’ satisfaction using
this channel was not always up to their expectations [8].
Citizens contact government for various reasons such as
trying to inﬂuence public policy, to addressing personal con-
cerns that they have, conducting government transactions,
and ﬁnding information on beneﬁts and services that govern-
ment offers [9].aculty of Computers and Information, Cairo University.
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increasingly being viewed as a logical paradigm [9]. A citizen
may ﬁrst use the website for general information needed, may
use the phone for clariﬁcation, andﬁnallymail in the formor take
it directly to the government ofﬁce. Therefore, e-government
may be one step, among many steps, in public service delivery.
Most governments have engaged into e-government initia-
tives, having different views of e-government including better
public service delivery, better governance and participation
as well as better public resources management. These initia-
tives achieved different levels of success, and only a very lim-
ited percentage of the e-government systems in developing
countries are successful cases, while the rest are either total
or partial failures [10].
A number of proposed theoretical models tried to analyze
the reasons for the failure of such a huge failure proportion
of e-government projects [11–13].
These models include ‘‘ITPOSMO model’’ [14], ‘‘design-
reality’’ gaps, challenges for e-government initiatives [15],
and e-projects challenges and barriers [16].
Egyptian e-government program started as early as 2001
and implemented several pilot projects. Some of these pilots
succeeded and were rolled out all over the country, while
others were less successful, and were either discontinued or
re-modeled and re-implemented. Some roll-out projects
succeeded and others were less successful than their pilots.
For the same type of project, some implementation sites were
more successful than others, some started successfully and then
relapsed while similar ones continued successfully. Identifying
the reasons for success and failure of these projects is of utmost
importance for future implementations.
The author of this work was closely engaged in the design
and implementation of the Egyptian e-government project
from its early beginnings in 2001; as the e-government services
project manager, then the director of the Government Services
Modernization Program as of 2006. The author managed tens
of projects, of which some won regional and international
awards while others faced problems. He recently returned to
the academia with a vision to join his ﬁeld-acquired experience
with the scientiﬁc research techniques, to deﬁnitely identify the
critical failure factors and help the community avoid them.
Several research works tried to identify reasons of success
and failure for e-government projects. Different views have
been advanced and different factors have been identiﬁed as
success or failure factors [13]. Luckily, one of the Egyptian
e-government projects was reviewed at different phases of its
existence, using different research approaches. This represents
a wealth of information that can be exploited beyond the limits
of each individual research.
Originally, a research team reviewed the system implemen-
tation and operation at one of the governorates of Egypt
(Matrouh), just a few months after its implementation [17].
The team conﬁrmed the success of the system as it reduced
the process number of steps and the step duration. The project
was accordingly declared successful.
A few years later, the Matrouh site was revisited together
with a new implementation at a different governorate (site
named Al-Tor) [18]. It was then realized that the project had
relapsed in Matrouh, while it was performing well at Al-Tor.
The different success and failure factors for each site were thus
identiﬁed, which mostly indicted the human resources for the
collapse of the Matrouh site.Still, 2 years later, the 2 former sites were revisited, as well as a
more recent implementation in the city of PortSaid [19] inorder to
identify themain factor for the ‘‘system success.’’ Itwas then iden-
tiﬁed the ‘‘system quality’’ as the most dominant Success/Failure
factor, according to the Information System Success Model.
The 3 papers [17–19] represent a rare opportunity to study
the evolution of identical e-government project’s implementa-
tion in different sites (and from different perspectives) and
the factors of their success or failure.
This paper is an effort trying to identify in a more deﬁnitive
way the reasons of e-government projects failure, and what are
the most important pitfalls to avoid, in order to ensure success.
In the following, the author will review and scrutinize the
ﬁndings of the papers mentioned above. Then, he will uncover
the intricate relationship between the different factors adopted
by different methodologies, their interdependence, and their
relative importance. By doing so, he will ﬁnally identify the
main factors that lead to success or failure of the project and
recommend the actions required to avoid future failures.
2. Background
2.1. Egypt
Egypt is considered to be one of the oldest states in history [20]
and is characterized by a highly central government. Local
administration is performed through antennas of the central
government in a number of administrative divisions named
governorates, which in turn are divided into cities and districts.
Local governments – governorates – have a limited level of
autonomy in the way they provide their services to citizens
and the way they manage their administrative processes.
One important department at the governorate level is the
investment department and is directly managed by the gover-
norate. Its function is to promote and supervise investment
in the governorate and ensure it is in the best interest of the
community. It approves investors’ project proposals, allocates
the required lands to these projects, and tracks the conformity
of ongoing projects with their approved proposals.
2.2. Local e-government in Egypt
The Egyptian e-government program in Egypt started in 2001
within the Ministry of Communication and Information Tech-
nology (MCIT) and was a component of the Egyptian Infor-
mation Society Initiative (EISI), Egypt Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) strategy. In 2004, the pro-
gram was transferred to the Ministry of State for Administra-
tive Development (MSAD), as an element of administrative
reform and development, together with the institutional re-
form of public administration [21–23].
The Egyptian Local Government Development Program
(ELGDP) is a component of the e-government Services pro-
gram within the e-government Initiative [24,25]. It focuses on
service enhancement in municipalities through the automation
of citizen services and the establishment of the so-called Smart
‘‘Citizen-Service-Centers.’’ ELGDP projects do not aim to
fully automate the services, but rather reduces service delivery
time, and overcomes corruption within public administration
through a rigorous monitoring and control system, using IT
and modern management systems.
Table 1 Key indicators for the 3 governorates.
Matrouh South Sinai Port Said
Population (thousands) 323,381 150,088 570,603
% Of Egypt’s population 2.21 0.21 1.25
Area (1000 km2) 166,563 31,272 1.3511
% Of Egypt’s area 16.6 3.1 0.13
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The main objective of the project is to assist the local author-
ities managing investment projects within the governorate,
through an information system that covers all the service re-
lated procedure, bypassing the cumbersome paper-based activ-
ities. The information system integrates MIS, GIS, and
workﬂow functionalities and connects the relevant depart-
ments through a Local Area Network. The GIS maintains spa-
tial information of the available and used lands, and ongoing
projects, while the workﬂow and database maintain all related
administrative information. Administrative and spatial data
are consolidated in one system to be jointly analyzed and sup-
port the decision making within the governorate.
Spatial information is availed to other departments and the
public, thus simplifying the identiﬁcation of vacant parcels of
land, fulﬁlling the project requirements both for staff, inves-
tors, and decision makers.
It is worthwhile pointing out that most of the department
activities require human intervention and insight, and that
the information system only complements it and provides over-
sight, tracking, monitoring and control, without which the local
authorities would poorly manage its projects and resources.
2.4. Projects status at the time of comparison
The ﬁrst implementation of the project was in Matrouh in
2006. The system was then successful and remained functional
for several months, which led to planning for its roll-out in sev-
eral other sites [17]. By the end of 2007, the information system
in Matrouh faced some problems that led to its abolition by
2008, as reported in [18]. The system continued functioning
in the other two sites of South Sinai (Al-Tor) and Port Said,
while Matrouh site went out of operation until revived with
its new management late 2010 [19].
The case, thus, was then classiﬁed as a ‘‘user failure’’ demon-
strating that factors other than technology were the immediate
reason of the set-back [18]. On the other hand, the implementa-
tion in Al-Tor remained successful after more than one year un-
der the same management. At the time that work was prepared
[18], Port Said implementation was still at start up with few
months of operation and seemed to be a promising success.
In the following, a brief introduction of the three sites will
be presented to familiarize the reader with the context.
2.5. Three sites
Project sites are the cities of Matrouh, Al-Tor and Port Said;
capitals of the respective governorates of Matrouh, South Si-
nai (Al-Tor) and Port Said). For better understanding, the fol-
lowing is a quick description of each governorate as it was at
the time of the previous research works were performed
[17,18,26].
2.5.1. Matrouh
Matrouh is a border governorate with a large desert sparse area
of about 17% of Egypt and a coast that stretches over 450 km
along theMediterranean Sea. Its economic activities are limited
to national and timid international tourism, olive cultivation
and processing, as well as other handicraft activities.2.5.2. South Sinai
South Sinai is much smaller than Matrouh with area of 3.1%
of Egypt. South Sinai is one of the internationally renowned
resort sites. It contains historical sites like Mount Sinai and
St. Catherine’s Monastery, in addition to recreational diving
and reserves sites. It contains 14.7% of the total number of ho-
tels in Egypt and is attractive to investors.
2.5.3. Port Said
Port Said is rather an urban governorate, limited in area and
population, with the port-city of Port Said at its center. The
city of Port Said is a Free Zone Port, at the entrance of the
Suez Canal on the Mediterranean. Its economic activities are
basically trade, commerce, maritime service and industries as
well as national tourism. The city had several institutes that
were part of the Suez Canal University, out of which emerged
the University of Port Said.
Table 1 presents some key indicators of the three Govern-
orates (adapted from [26]).
As can be noted from the description above, Matrouh and
South Sinai governorates are similar in many aspects, notably
the investments in tourism. Land allocation for projects is usu-
ally faced by the informal land appropriation by local
Bedouins.
Port Said implementation was rather a new implementation
at the time of analysis, and thus, no information about the
status of operation was given in [18]. In what follows, only
Matrouh and Al-Tor projects will be studied.
According to [26], three types of failure have been identiﬁed
in literature: System failure, Project failure, and User Failure.
The Matrouh case actually achieved a system and project suc-
cesses before its relapse and can be considered successful dur-
ing the project span and until several months after its initial
implementation. This led us, in this work, to engage into a re-
view of the analysis of the project advanced by [18].
In the following section (Section 4), analysis of the ﬁnd-
ings of each paper and the used methodology will be pre-
sented and compared with each other. In Section 4.1, we
will analyze and review the methodology and ﬁndings pre-
sented in [18]. In Section 4.2, we will review the ﬁndings of
[19] and relate them to the success and failure factors ana-
lyzed in Section 4.1; hence, we will identify the factors that
we accuse of being the critical failure factors if the project.
In Section 4.3, we will review the ﬁndings of [27] and uncover
the relation between administrative discretion and its affect-
ing factors from one side and the failure factors identiﬁed
in both Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
3. Analysis of previous ﬁndings
The situation description in [17] illustrates the situation in
Matrouh (the site under investigation) recently after the
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‘‘The new system saved the department – and the governorate
as a whole – signiﬁcant time and ﬁscal resources that would be
better allocated to other tasks. The system, further, helps pro-
mote economic development by facilitating access to data
about infrastructure, business, and demographic, economic,
and human resources.’’ It also reports that the system in ques-
tion leads to ‘‘the improvement in different process steps’ dura-
tion and the percentage reduction in the durations
respectively.’’
Three years later, a comparison was conducted between the
Matrouh site and a recent implementation at the site of Al-Tor
[18]. The Matrouh project had then relapsed, while Al-Tor was
performing well. It is needless to mention that the two project
were thus in different phases of their lifetime: Al-Tor was still
under close supervision of the implementing body (Ministry of
State for Administrative Development MSAD) while Matrouh
was self-running for over 2 years.
3.1. Case I: success and failure factors using ITPOSMO
ITPOSMO [14] methodology was adopted to identify the dif-
ferent success and failure factors for each site; the methodol-
ogy covers the 7 following factors (summarized in Fig. 1):
(1) Information (factors related to quality and prerequisites
of system inputs and outputs);
(2) Technology (factors such as the availability and compat-
ibility of hardware and software);
(3) Processes (alignment and integration between the system
and existing/new processes to achieve stated objectives);
(4) Objectives, Values, and Motivation (e.g. organization cul-
ture, guiding values);
(5) Stafﬁng and Skills (factors such as the availability of
skilled personnel and adequacy of training provided
for using the system);
(6) Management and Structures (factors such as managerial
practice and ﬂexibility of organizational structures); and
(7) Other Resources (money and time).
It is worthwhile stating here that no-one-factor is consid-
ered as the factor that resulted in the failure, but it is rather
the effect of all or few of the failure factors identiﬁed.
The information factor was considered a failure factor in
[18] as ‘‘it led to the reduction of potential corruption.’’ The
case in Matrouh identiﬁed information to be available and
accurate. This contradicted with staff interest and indicated






Objectives, Values, and Motivation  Staffing and Skills 
Management and Structures  
Figure 1 Elements of ITPOSMO model.nization’s. This should not turn the information factor into a
failure one; otherwise, failing to provide the necessary and ade-
quate information would be considered a success factor, which
is inconceivable. The resolution in [18] making the information
a failure factor is thus a composite one that included the effect
of two factors: information and values. For the project to suc-
ceed, information obviously needed to be available and ade-
quate, and this was the case.
Consequently we consider the information a success factor,
the failure effect is thus transferred to the Objectives, values,
and Motivation factor.
The Technology factor is rather a tricky one. Originally, it
was a success factor since the necessary equipment and software
were made available, and the system was properly operational.
With time, lack of maintenance and vulnerability to malicious
software resulted in a degradation of the system. Since the sys-
tem was functional with the given platform for a sufﬁcient per-
iod before its degradation, as per the project deﬁnition, the
technology was suitable and can be viewed as a success factor.
Its degradation with time is a maintenance issue and should
thus be reﬂected in the ‘‘Staff and Skills’’ factor.
The process factor was considered a success factor in both
sites, and we did not ﬁnd any reason to contest this ﬁnding.
The ‘‘Objectives, Values and Motivation’’ is considered a
failure factor in Matrouh as shown in [18]. It identiﬁes the Bed-
ouins’ tradition as ‘‘in contradiction’’ with the State values and
Objectives: the Bedouin values contradicted the national gov-
ernment values in what relates to the land appropriation.
The staff culture in Matrouh site is the dominant culture and
contradicted with the organization values. These community
values might affect the staff values, as part of it. But it is worth
mentioning here that Al-Tor also suffers from the same Bedou-
ins’ values effect, since Sinai is also of tribal tradition. So, we
concur that the community values are in contradiction with the
project objectives and represent a failure factor, but it is a fact
that during the initial phase of project implementation in Ma-
trouh and in Al-Tor, this factor did not result in the system or
project failure. We thus consider this factor to be a Failure
Factor in Matrouh, but not sufﬁcient by itself for failure.
It was also pointed out [18] that the existing Matrouh staff
was hiding information about the existing system from their
new management. This is obviously an evidence of mismatched
values between the staff and the organization, but it also
reveals a hidden deﬁciency in the institutional management
related to handover procedures, as will be discussed here
under.
The Stafﬁng and Skills factor was identiﬁed in [18] as a fail-
ure factor as the staff initially refused to provide necessary
information for the software developers, fearing that the IT
would replace them. Stafﬁng factor was also considered a fail-
ure factor in both sites as being used to manual procedures and
requiring much time to be prepared for the new technology
and work methods. It also identiﬁed the lack of professional
IT maintenance personnel as a failure factor. Nevertheless, this
did not prevent the project from initially succeeding in Ma-
trouh and later in Al-Tor. We thus consider this factor not suf-
ﬁcient for failure.
The ‘‘Management and structure’’ factor was identiﬁed in
[18] as the ‘‘key failure factor’’ in Matrouh, as the lack of prop-
er handover procedure between managements, and the contin-
ual interest of each new management to boast its own deeds
and devaluates previous deeds, as well as the change of vision
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existing initiatives. It is worth noting that Al-Tor implementa-
tion was successful as long as no change in management oc-
curred, particularly the immediate management (that is the
IT or the service department manger) which was the project
champion. The case in Matrouh was different since the cham-
pion was the Governor, and with the change of governors, the
direct management and staff lost interest (willingly or unwill-
ingly), and when came a new department manager, any trace
of the system was already hidden.
Table 2 shows each of the factors affecting success or failure
according to ITMOPSOmodel and its assessment for both sites
as reported in [18]. The additional column is added to report
additional interpretation of the assessment. It is interesting to
note that despite of some factors being identiﬁed as failure fac-
tors, the project succeeded in Al-Tor and initially in Matrouh.
This led the author to classify the different factors as sufﬁcient
for failure, necessary for success or just catalyst to either.
3.2. Case II: factors affecting e-gov. Effectiveness using ISSM
In [26], the Information System Success Model was adopted
identifying 6 attributes for the system success. Each attribute
effect was identiﬁed through a set of questions (see Table 3),
which revealed the high dependence of the ‘‘system use’’ on
the ‘‘system quality’’ and a moderate dependence on the ‘‘ser-
vice quality.’’
Three of these attributes are identiﬁed as independent: Infor-
mation quality, System quality, and Service quality. The three
other attributes depend on the ﬁrst three, either directly or indi-
rectly. The ‘‘perceived net beneﬁt’’ attribute depends mainly on
the ‘‘system use’’ attribute and ‘‘user satisfaction,’’ which in turn
depends on the ‘‘system use.’’ The 3 independent attributes cov-
er only part of 4 of the above factors as shown in Table 4.
Table 3 maps the ITPOSMO factors to the questions used
for the ISSM analysis. It clearly identiﬁes that the ISSM does
not cover the factors ‘‘Objectives, values and motives’’ nor the
‘‘Management and Structure.’’ This is logical since ISSM focus
is the ‘‘Information System’’ and not the entire organization
and is not considered a ﬂaw in the methodology. On the con-
trary, it is a useful tool to separate the different factors affect-
ing the success of the e-government project.
It was concluded [26] that the system quality had the largest
effect on both ‘‘system use’’ and ‘‘user satisfaction’’ with highTable 2 Individual success/failure factors: sites evaluation and rela
ITPOSMO factor Matrouh. As per [18] Matro




Objectives, Values, and Motivation F F
Staﬃng and Skills F F
Management and Structures F S- to-F
Other Resources F S/F
F: failure factor, S: success factor, S/F: partially success or failure factor
S-to-F: initially success factor that turned in failure factor.signiﬁcance. ‘‘Service quality’’ still had a slight impact on the
‘‘system use’’ but at a less signiﬁcance.
‘‘Information Quality’’ however did not seem to have an ef-
fect on the ‘‘system use’’ as expected/predicted according to
ﬁndings of [28], and similarly ‘‘service quality’’ had no signiﬁ-
cant effect on ‘‘user satisfaction.’’
It is not the interest of this paper to explain the cultural rea-
sons behind the discrepancies; however, we consider these re-
sults as input to our analysis trying to understand the
success and failure of the ‘‘entire project,’’ of which the ‘‘Infor-
mation System’’ is the main, but not the only, component.
According to the elements’ analysis in Tables 2 and 4, the
information system satisﬁes most success factors and was actu-
ally successful for a period of time after which the project col-
lapsed. Attributing the set-back to the Information System
would be diverting the management efforts toward solving
the wrong problem.
As per the analysis of the ITPOSMO ﬁndings above,
‘‘Objectives, values and Motives’’ and ‘‘Management and
Structure’’ were identiﬁed as the main failure factors. This
complements the ﬁndings above that the Information System
should be successful according to ISSM.
3.3. Relation between administrative discretion and corruption
A separate study of the inﬂuence of e-government on administra-
tive discretion was also conducted to identify the e-government
factors that affect the administrative discretion. Administrative
discretion is the ability of the public ofﬁcial to make choices
among possible courses of action and inaction [29]. There are 3
ways that street-level bureaucrats can use their discretion:
 Stretch the law to determine the worthiness of a client.
 Act as gatekeepers for the service, thus increasing the level
of red-tape.
 Become ‘‘rogue agents’’ and ‘‘punish’’ citizens and provide
favoritism.
E-government is supposed to be capable of reducing admin-
istrative discretion by becoming the system level bureaucrat,
replacing human decision making [30]. According to[27], liter-
ature claims that e-government implementation has a positive
inﬂuence on the organization through positively affecting 6
factors:tive importance.
uh reviewed AL-Tor Catalyst, necessary or suﬃcient









Table 3 Mapping ITPOSMO to Information System Success Model.
ISSM factor Related question in [26] ITPOSMO factor (s)
Information quality IQ1. Data needed for system operations is available 1 Information
Information quality IQ2. The system provides the precise information that I need (Doll & Torkzadeh, 1988) 1 Information
Information quality IQ3. The system provides up to date information (Doll & Torkzadeh, 1988) 1 Information
Information quality IQ4. Data resulting from the system is suitable and matches business needs 1 Information
Information quality IQ5. The system presents output data in representative and suitable way 1 Information
System quality SQ1. The system crashed several times 2 Technology
System quality SQ2. There is periodical maintenance of the hardware and software 2 Technology
System quality SQ3. There is obvious and complete integration of data coming from diﬀerent departments 1 + 2 Information
Technology
System quality SQ4. The system makes the process of land allocation more accurate 3 Processes
System quality SQ5. The system instantaneously informs me about the status of the investment projects 3 Processes
System quality SQ6. The system is easy to use (Doll & Torkzadeh, 1988) 2 + 3 + 5 Technology
Processes
Staﬃng and Skills
Service quality SV1. The employees are qualiﬁed enough to use the system 5 Staﬃng and Skills
Service quality SV2. Employees transfer their experience about the system to each other 5 Staﬃng and Skills




4 Objectives, Values, and Motivation
5 Staﬃng and Skills
6 Management and Structures
7 Other Resources
Table 4 Mapping the ﬁndings of [18] to the questions in [26].




System qualityObjectives, Values, and
Motivation
Staffing and Skills
Service qualityManagement and Structures
Other Resources
Figure 2 The inﬂuence of e-government on administrative
discretion.
170 H. Elkadi1. Organization change.
2. Information security.
3. Size of government.
4. Collaboration.
5. Top management support.
6. Citizen demand for e-government.
and that these factors in turn affect the administration dis-
cretion, leading to a better performance and service. Fig. 2 rep-
resents this relation [27].
Table 5 summarizes how each of the above factors affects
the administrative discretion, as explained in [27]. Analysis of
these factors and how they ﬁnally affect the administration dis-
cretion leads to identiﬁcation of direct and indirect effects of
these factors.
Fig. 3 summarizes the inter-relation between the different
factors and ﬁnally the administrative discretion, as depicted
in Table 5, where we clarify the dependencies between the dif-
ferent factors mentioned and administrative discretion. Itshows that administrative discretion is affected directly by
organizational and cultural changes (and collaboration) which
emanate from e-government adoption and implementation.
As mentioned previously in this section, there are 3 (nega-
tive) ways street-level bureaucrats can use their discretion.
Combined with ill morals, discretion would result in intended
corruption. This will be discussed in detail in the next section.
In [27], only two factors were found to affect administrative
discretion: collaboration and organizational change. This is in
conformity with the analysis and ﬁndings above, where the
‘‘Management and Structure’’ factor was indicted as the main
failure factor for Matrouh.
4. Discussion
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we studied the e-government project
implemented in Matrouh and Al-Tor. We demonstrated
Table 5 Factors inﬂuencing administrative discretion.
Factor Type of inﬂuence/Inﬂuence path
Organizational Change E-government pushes for profound transformation in the
organization of public sector. It reduces manual processes
leading to eﬃcient service delivery. It also empowers employees
to make more decisions on their own
E-Gov: causesﬁ Org. Change:reducesﬁ Admin. Discretion
Top Management Support Supports e-government and IT adoption, facilitating
IT innovation, inﬂuencing organizational change and
administrative discretion
Top Mgmt. Support:adoptsﬁ e-Gov.:inﬂuences ﬁ Org. Change
Collaboration E-government has re-integrated the organization putting
back together many of the elements of the organization
that were decentralized, creating new opportunities for
collaboration, which should inﬂuence e-government and
Administrative discretion
E-Gov: promotesﬁ organization change: promotesﬁ Collaboration:inﬂuencesﬁ e-Gov and Admin. Discretion
Information Security Management support for Information security is a critical
success factor for e-government. A culture of awareness of
the importance of information security means more eﬀective
implementation of e-government, inﬂuencing public oﬃcials’
views of e-government, aﬀecting administrative discretion
Top Mgmt. Support: Success Factorﬁ e-government
Cultural Change: awarenessﬁ information security: improvesﬁ e-Gov.: aﬀectsﬁ Admin. Discretion
Citizens’ Demand for e-government Individuals that are more satisﬁed with their experience with
e-government are more likely to trust their government.
Citizens and their demand for e-government should indicate
external pressure for its implementation and eﬀect (Cohen in USA)
This statement is valid for mature democracies,
where local authorities are elected by well-educated citizens,
but not valid in weak democracies where local authorities
are appointed by central government
Citizen:demandﬁ e-Gov.:enhancesﬁ Service Quality:satisﬁesﬁ Citizen
Size of Government Size aﬀected e-government adoption in local government
in the USA. Larger government has more resources to
fund more advanced e-government
This is also valid in mature democracies where resources are
collected from local taxes. In other cases (such as Egypt),
resources are drawn from the central government budget
with possible local contributions. This conforms to the
ﬁnding of paper 10 where the portals of Matrouh, Menouﬁya,
and Cairo were at the same maturity level despite the large
discrepancy in the governorates’ population sizes
Size of Government: aﬀectﬁ e-Gov
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both sites and was not the reason behind the subsequent failure
of the originally successful project. We identiﬁed two factors as
the possible failure factors of the project: the ‘‘Objectives, Val-
ues and Incentives’’ and the ‘‘Organizational Structure.’’
The problems that were clearly pointed out by [18] were the
reluctance of the staff from cooperating with the software
development company at the time of its development, the fact
that they concealed the existing system from their new man-
agement that intended to develop a new system, as well as
the lack of proper handover from old to new management.
The system in question is related to the allocation of lands
for investments and involves large investments. The existence
of the system limited the administrative discretion of the in-
volved staff and their ability to ‘‘selectively serve’’ the investors
and proﬁt from the ‘‘return of these services.’’ Administrative
discretion was then the means to corruption; which the systemprevented, and getting the system off the way was the solution
the staff resorted to. They succeeded in eliminating the system
due to the ﬂaw in management handover procedures. The
‘‘Objectives, Values and Incentives’’ factor was demonstrated
to be a catalyst factor (necessary but not sufﬁcient), while
the Organizational Structure was a necessary factor.
In Section 4.3, we demonstrated that the e-government fac-
tors that directly affect the administrative discretion are the
‘‘Organizational Change’’ and the ‘‘Collaboration.’’ The col-
laboration was a result of the Organizational change factor
which seems to be the main cause that directly affected the
administrative discretion and thus can be the dominant factor
that controls administrative discretion.
From the above, we can conclude that corruption (inherent
in staff values) ﬁghts the e-government back, since it contra-
dicts with the staff interest. Such a resistance can be overcome
by proper management and institutional structure. The lack of
Figure 3 Administrative-discretion factors-dependency-diagram. The inter-relation between the different factors and the administrative
discretion.
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good management, but if this latter disappears, e-government
is doomed to fail.
The above ﬁndings can be translated into a set of practical
recommendations to avoid the failure pitfalls and the different
failure factors identiﬁed above:
 Enforce proper documentation of all public administration
departments’ projects and initiatives, and maintain a copy
of it at the higher administrative levels to avoid organiza-
tional memory loss.
 Provide for a handover phase between management
changes, supported by the above mentioned
documentation.
 Establish a periodic inspection process to ensure that previ-
ously developed systems are up and running, and well
utilized.
5. Conclusion
Reviewing the multiple studies assessing the e-government pro-
ject in Matrouh and Al-Tor cities of Egypt, we could establish
a correspondence between the different elements of two differ-
ent assessment methodologies, namely ITPOSMO and ISSM.
The analysis of the previous works not only acquitted the
information system from being the failure factor, but also
identiﬁed the factors that have to be stressed upon in future
implementation.
We could identify, among the ITPOSMO methodology,
factors that can be considered critical success and/or failure
factors, and others that can be only catalyzers (not sufﬁcient
by their own, but help if other factors exist). Reviewing the
previous work, we could identify the projection of one factor
(values) on other factors, which led to misjudgment of the ef-
fect of these factors.
The main factor that was found to be critical for both suc-
cess and failure is the organizational structure which also cor-
responds to the organizational change factor that affects
administrative discretion (and thus corruption).This work is built around previously conducted surveys and
analysis. It actually revises the conclusions made in the previ-
ous works and integrates the results from the different surveys.
A dedicated survey would be in order for the veriﬁcation of
these ﬁndings.
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